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ABSTRACT 
Fission product leakage from the fuel elements of the Plum Brook Reactor (PBR) 
The causes of Facility resulted from corrosion and physical damage of the elements. 
the corrosion and physical damage a r e  discussed. A method of measuring fission pro- 
duct release from irradiated elements and a method of remote disassembly and examina- 
tion of leaking elements in the PBR Hot Laboratory Facility a r e  described. The use of 
the iodine-133 to iodine-131 ( I ~ ~ ~ / I ~ ~ ~ )  ratio and a nitrogen-17 (N17) fission product 
monitor in detecting the injection and source of fission products in the reactor cooling 
water system a r e  discussed. 
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CAUSES, MEASUREMENT, AND ELIMINATION OF 
FUEL-ELEMENT FISSION PRODUCT LEAKAGE 
AT THE NASA PLUM BROOK REACTOR 
by A. Bert  Davis and Richard H. Br ickley 
Lewis Research Center 
SUMMARY 
Fission product leakage to the Plum Brook Reactor Primary Cooling Water (PCW) 
System occurred in five consecutive reactor cycles from June 1 to September 23, 1968. 
This report discusses the source and bauses of this leakage and the methods used to 
determine the source and causes. 
The source of the fission products was  leaking fue l  elements. The leakage was  
caused by (1) physical damage resulting from foreign particles in the PCW System and 
(2) pitting-type corrosion of the fuel elements. The foreign particles resulted from 
major core beryllium replacement. An electrical discharge machine had been used to  
remove reactor core beryllium structures which had failed. The resulting particles 
were satisfactorily removed by a 1/32-inch- (0.795-mm-) hole-size filter. The pitting- 
type corrosion resulted from extended storage of elements (between uses in the reactor) 
in water. Elements stored for 70 days in water of 5 to 30 micromhos per centimeter, 
10 days in water of 3 to 5 micromhos per centimeter, and 110 days in water of less than 
3 micromhos per centimeter had cladding failure. Elements stored for 225 days in water 
of less  than 3 micromhos per centimeter also had cladding failure, but not as extensive. 
A dry  sipping apparatus was successfully used to locate leaking irradiated elements. 
The elements were placed in an air-filled chamber and allowed to heat to 300' F (420 K). 
A sample of the air was taken and analyzed for xenon-133 (Xe 
fission product monitor were valuable in detecting fission product injection into the PCW 
and in determining whether the source was fuel-element leakage or system uranium con- 
tamination. The application of the I 133/1131 ratio and the N1? fission product monitor are 
described in this report. 
The apparatus used for  this disassembly and the results of the examination performed are 
discussed. Photographs of the pitted and damaged elements are presented. 
133 
). 
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) The iodine-133 to iodine-131 ( I ~ ~ ~ / I ~ ~ ~ )  ratio and data from a nitrogen-17 (N 
Two fuel elements were remotely disassembled in the PBR Hot Laboratory Facility. 
INTROD UCTlON 
Fission product leakage from the Plum Brook Reactor (PBR) fuel elements was 
experienced in reactor cycles 76 through 80, during the time period June 1 to Septem- 
ber 23, 1968. Since the magnitude of the leakage was small  compared to that which has 
been experienced at other reactors, this aspect of the problem may not be of much in- 
terest. However, the causes of the leakage and the methods used to determine the source 
and the causes should be quite helpful to operators of other reactors. 
The report is divided into four sections and three appendixes. The f i r s t  section 
covers background information necessary to understand the remairiing parts of the re - 
port. This is followed by sections covering (1) a summary of investigations made in 
reactor cycles 76 through 80 to determine the source of the fission products, (2) the 
analyses and investigations made to determine the cause of the problem after the source 
was identified, and (3) the conclusions reached as a result of the effort. Appendix A 
describes how the I 133/~131 ratio and the N17 fission product monitor were used in de- 
tecting the injection and source of fission products. Appendix B describes a dry sipping 
apparatus used to locate leaking irradiated fuel elements. Appendix C describes a 
disassembly apparatus used to remotely disassemble two fue l  elements in the PBR Hot 
Laboratory Facility. 
The most important features of the report a r e  the determination of the causes of the 
fission product leakage and the methods used in determining the source and causes. One 
cause was physical damage of the fuel  elements. The method used to eliminate the da- 
mage mechanism is covered. The second cause was pitting-type corrosion of the ele- 
ments. The environment and the time in this environment which resulted in the corro- 
sion a r e  covered; however, the reasons for the corrosion are not explored in depth. 
were used to assess the source of fission product release to the PCW System is dis- 
cussed. The interpretation of the data is related to reactor cycle operating experience. 
Detailed information on the design and operation of a dry sipping apparatus is pre- 
sented. The results obtained in dry sipping irradiated fuel elements are tabulated. 
The apparatus used to remotely disassemble two leaking fuel elements is discussed 
in detail. Photographs of the disassembled elements a r e  presented along with the results 
of the examination. 
c 
133 131 ratio The method by which the N17 fission product monitor data and the I /I 
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Facility Description 
The PBR is a 60-megawatt -thermal pressurized-water test reactor. The reactor 
core is mounted in a tank 9 feet (2.74 m) in diameter by 30 feet (9.14 m) high (fig. 1). 
of a 3 by 9 a r ray  of 22 MTR-type standard fuel elements and 5 control rods with fueled 
follower sections. 
The PBR Primary Cooling Water  (PCW) System has a volume of about 30 000 gallons 
(113.4 m ) and a flow rate of about 17 800 gallons per minute (1. 12 m /sec). It contains 
a bypass cleanup system and a f u l l  flow strainer. The bypass cleanup system contains 
two mixed bed ion exchangers. 
per minute ( 6 . 3 ~ 1 0 - ~  m3/sec). 
1/16-inch (1. 59-mm) openings. 
an aluminum-enriched uranium alloy. The fuel-plate spacing in an element is 0.115 inch 
(2.93 mm). The spacing between plates of adjacent elements, when they are installed in 
the core, is 0.120 inch (3.06 mm). The fuel-plate cores a r e  0.020 inch (0. 51 mm) thick 
and consist of highly enriched uranium alloyed with aluminum alloy 1060, ASTM 
B-209-62. The 0.020-inch (0. 51-mm) aluminum cladding is alloy 1100, ASTM B-209-62. 
The control rod fueled sections contain 14 curved aluminum plates which a r e  identical 
to the standard fuel-element plates except for length. When new, the standard fuel ele- 
ments contain 240 grams of uranium-235 (U235), and the control rod elements contain 
186 grams of U235. The elements have been supplied by three different vendors since 
the initial operation of the PBR. Fuel burnup is presently limited to 113 megawatt 
days (9X1O2' fissions/cm ) per element. The maximum calculated heat flux to the PCW 
System is 1.72~10 Btu per hour per square foot (5.45X10 J/m /sec). The maximum 
calculated fuel-element temperature at this heat flux is 331' F (440 K). 
to the established operating limit. These can be three consecutive cycles or three or 
more nonconsecutive cycles depending on planned or unplanned deviations from the PBR 
standard-length cycle. Between nonconsecutive uses the elements are stored in con- 
tainers in a water -filled canal. The storage containers are constructed of stainless 
steel and cadmium, both of which a r e  exposed to the canal water. 
The core components a r e  shown in figure 2. The fueled section of the core consists 
3 3 
The flow rate through the system is about 100 gallons 
The full flow strainer is a basket-type strainer with 
The standard fuel elements are assemblies of 18 curved aluminum-clad plates of 
3 
6 6 2 
The fuel elements are used in at least three reactor cycles before becoming depleted 
3 
Beryl  I iu m Replacement 
When beryllium is exposed to fast neutrons, embrittlement and gas formation re- 
sult. This gas formation caused the south beryllium plate (fig. 2) of the PBR core box 
to bow toward the core. After about 37 000 megawatt days (3. 2X1Ol2 kW-sec) of reactor 
operation, the embrittled plate cracked. Since the beryllium plate was installed with 
nonaccessible bolts and because it had swelled, the plate was removed by a remote 
electrical discharge machining (EDM) method. More information on the beryllium dis - 
tortion and replacement can be found in reference 1. A chip collection system and an 
underwater vacuum cleaning system were used to keep the PCW System clean during 
the EDM operations. 
b 
L im i t i ng  Fission Product Levels and Methods of Measurement 
6 The activity level of the PCW is limited to l X 1 0 - 4  microcurie per milliliter (3.7xlO 
3 90 8 
3 
dis/sec/m ) of strontium-90 (Sr 
dis/sec/m ) of 1131 by the Technical Specifications for  the PBR. We routinely deter- 
mine the activity levels of 1134 and Srg2 and use an established relation between them 
and 1131 and SrgO to stay within the Technical Specifications. The relatively short 
half-lives of 1134 and Srg2 permit a quicker assessment of fission product leakage. We 
also confirm the levels of 1131 and SrgO by radiochemistry analysis of a PCW sample 
taken immediately after reactor shutdown. 
into the PCW a re  discussed in appendix A. 
the I ~ ~ ~ / I ~ ~ ~  ratio. 
to the solution of the fission product leakage problem at PBR should be quite helpful. 
) and 1X10-2 microcurie per milliliter (3.7X10 
Two methods which proved to be very valuable in assessing fission product injection 
The interpretation and application of data obtained by these methods 
These a re  an N17 fission product monitor and 
Wet Sipping Method 
A wet sipping method has been used at PBR to locate leaking fuel elements. The 
reactor is operated at 50 kilowatts. A probe, through which 100 milliliters per minute 
of water is drawn, is inserted above the fuel-element channels. The water is passed 
through an anion bed which is subsequently analyzed for  fission products. 
This method gave errat ic  results and was not successful. This was  probably at- 
tributable to the low reactor power and the small fuel-element defects. These factors 
made it impossible to distinguish between fission products from PCW contamination and 
a true fuel-element leak. 
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Dry Sipping Method 
A dry sipping method (refs. 2 and 3) has been successfully used at  PBR to locate 
leaking fuel elements after they are removed from the reactor. 
mitted to heat in an air-filled chamber to 300' F (420 K) at 1-atmosphere pressure. A 
gas sample is taken and analyzed for  Xe133. The results are reported in microcuries 
per milliliter per minute (dis/sec/m ) of Xe133 at time of reactor shutdown. A detailed 
description of the apparatus is presented in appendix B. 
Fuel elements a re  per- 
3 
DETERMINATION OF FISSION PRODUCT SOURCE 
The fission product levels in the PCW were above normal in reactor cycles 76 
through 80. Cycle 76 was the first cycle after the reactor beryllium sideplates were 
replaced. 
7 7 of 1000 to 3500 disintegrations per minute per milliliter (1.67X10 to 5.85X10 dis/sec/ 
3 m ). The 1134 level for  cycle 80 is shown in figure 3. Cycle 80 had higher fission pro- 
9 3 duct levels (140 000 dis/min/ml (2.34X10 dis/sec/m )) than any other cycle in the 
history of PBR operation. As is obvious from the magnitude of the 1134 levels in 
' 
figure 3, the levels were kept within allowable, safe limits by reactor power decreases 
and cycle terminations. 
would most quickly identify the source or sources of the fission product leakage. This 
was done by using the following methods to gather information: 
(1) Operating the reactor with various fuel-element and fueled experiment loadings 
(2) Using the dry sipping apparatus in a standard controlled way to determine the 
The 1134 level for  a typical cycle with no leaking fuel elements varies in the range 
The primary goal, beginning with cycle 76, was to choose the course of action which 
and observing 1134 levels, I 133/~131 ratios, and the N17 fission product monitor 
Xe133 release from irradiated elements (This apparatus was built and first 
used between cycles 77 and 78. ) 
(3) Visually examining irradiated elements with binoculars through about 10 feet 
(3 m) of water shielding 
The possible causes of the fission product leakage were believed to be 
(1) A random fuel-element leak (Previous experience at PBR showed that minor 
fission products resulted from this cause about once every eight reactor cycles.) 
(2) An unidentified cause associated with the beryllium plate replacement 
(3) Reuse of a leaking element from a cycle prior to cycle 76 (This prior cycle would 
have had higher than normal 1134 levels, yet not as high as those in cycles 76 
through 80. The leaking element could be deteriorating with added use. ) 
5 
(4) Defective elements f rom a new fuel-element vendor (This could not be the sole 
cause since elements from vendor 3 were not used in the first cycle-76 
loading, nor were they used prior to cycle 76. ) 
(5) Failure of a fueled experiment 
A summary of the results obtained and conclusions reached in cycles 76 through 80 
is discussed in the following paragraphs. This information may be useful to the reader 
in developing and executing a plan should he be faced with a fission product release to a 
reactor cooling water system. 
From cycle-76 operation with three fuel-element loadings, a wet sipping of a 
cycle-76 core, and visual examination of the core and elements removed from the core, 
the following conclusions were reached: 
(1) The wet sipping method was not effective in locating leaking fuel elements. 
(2) Damage was being done to the elements by foreign particles in the PCW. In 
spite of the efforts to maintain system cleanliness described in the section Beryllium 
Replacement, these foreign particles were most likely beryllium chips left in the sys- 
tem after the beryllium plate replacement. The damage was attributable to foreign par- 
ticles because a path of corresponding gouges was found on exterior plates of adjacent 
fuel elements. It was apparent that a particle had worked its way down between these 
elements, causing damage to both. 
core straining operation was performed. This straining consisted of substituting a series 
of screens with hole size varying from 1/4 to 1/32 inch (6.35 to 0.795 mm) for the 
3-by-9 a r ray  of fuel elements. The PCW System was  then operated until no further 
chips were collected on the screens. 
of the following conclusions was  possible: 
done in cycle 76, one of causes 1, 3, 4, or  5 previously described. 
separate damaged and undamaged elements. Cycle 77 contained some visually acceptable 
elements from cycle 76. 
ing. In spite of this, cycle 78 contained a fission product source. 
operation, either of the following conclusions was possible: 
A s  a result of these findings, the wet sipping operation was discontinued and a full 
This required 11 hours. 
Cycle 77 also contained a fission product source. From cycle-77 operation, either 
(1) There was a cause of fission product leakage in addition to the beryllium damage 
(2) A visual examination of elements used in cycle 76 was not a satisfactory way to 
Pr ior  to cycle 78, the dry sipping apparatus was  used to select the cycle fuel load- 
From the cycle-78 
(1) Causes 1, 3, 4, or 5 were causing fission products to be released to the PCW. 
(2) The dry sipping apparatus was not permitting separation of damaged from un- 
damaged elements. 
The second conclusion was believed to be more probable because the apparatus was new, 
the operating procedures were not properly followed, and there was little experience in 
operating the apparatus. 
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During cycles 79 and 80, various fuel loadings were used, and irradiated elements 
were dry sipped and visually examined in a controlled, standard manner. The following 
conclusions were reached 
(1) Cause 3 was eliminated. Core loadings with no elements from pre-76 cycles, 
which had higher than normal 1134 levels, still contained a source of fission products. 
(2) Cause 4 was eliminated. A core loading containing no elements from vendor 3 
still contained a source of fission products. 
(3) Cause 5 was eliminated. Experiment performance made this an unlikely contri- 
butor. Operation with the experiments removed still contained a source of fission pro- 
ducts. 
had to increase markedly. 
I 
(4) Cause 1 was unlikely because the frequency of the random failures would have 
(5) The dry sipping method was an effective way to locate leaking fuel elements. 
Table I shows the results of elements which were dry sipped. Elements which a r e  
considered to be definite leakers a r e  B-130, B-135, B-146, B-203, and BC-15. Although 
all elements used in cycles 76 through 80 were not dry sipped, at least one of these five 
elements was in each cycle. 
At the conclusion of cycle 80, all of the five postulated causes had been eliminated. 
However, examination of the history of the elements found to be leakers in the dry sip- 
ping operation showed element age to be a common factor for all elements except B-130. 
Element B-130 was considered to have been damaged in cycle 76. The other elements 
were not in cycle 76. Therefore, the age of an element (i. e., the time since its first 
use in the reactor) was determined to be a factor in fission product release to the PCW. 
One concern during cycles 76 through 80 was that a sudden burst of fission product 
release to the PCW might occur. This was not experienced. Although an increasing 
injection rate to the PCW was experienced, there was always time (about 1 to 2 hr  mini- 
mum) to react to this increase and maintain acceptable fission product levels. 
Beginning with cycle 81, fission product injection into the PCW from leaking fuel 
elements was eliminated. 
the time of beryllium replacement and the full core filtration and avoiding elements 
which were old in terms of time since their first use. 
One point of interest during the period of fission product leakage was the system 
contamination level being established. 
provided this information. The 1134 level, as a result of system uranium contamination, 
decreased from about 30 000 to 20 000 disintegrations per minute per milliliter 
(5x10 to 3.34X10 dis/sec/m ) during the cycle. Two cycles later, the level had 
dropped to about 10 000 disintegrations per minute per milliliter (1.67XlO dis/sec/m ). 
This was done by avoiding elements which were used between 
Cycle 81, which contained no leaking fuel element, 
8 8 3 
8 3 
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DETERMINATION OF CAUSE OF FISSION PRODUCT 
RELEASE FROM RELATIVELY OLD ELEMENTS 
The following investigations were begun to identify the cause of leakage from the 
' (1) Evaluations were made to determine if correlations existed between Xe 
old elements: 
re- 
lease from these relatively old elements in the dry sipping apparatus and the following 
parameters: average and peak-to-average fuel-element burnup, element storage time 
in water and water chemistry during this storage time, and element fabrication date. 
made. 
determine the appearance of these leaking elements. (See appendix C for  a description 
of the apparatus and method used to disassemble the elements. ) 
fabrication date. A correlation between element leakage and storage time in water was 
found. Figure 4 shows that the Xe133 release rate  in the dry sipping operation is less 
than 10x10'~  microcuries per milliliter per minute (6.2X10 dis/sec/m ) for  a water 
storage time of less than 190 days. This storage time does not include the time the 
elements were operated in the high-quality PCW System. Although the 10X10-5 micro- 
curies per milliliter per minute (6.2X10 dis/sec/m ) cannot be stated as a definite 
dividing point between a leaking element and a contaminated element, it  is close to the 
proper value. The water during this storage period varied between 1 and 30 micromhos 
per centimeter. It ranged between 5 and 30 micromhos per centimeter for 70 days and 
between 3 and 5 micromhos per centimeter for 10 days of this storage period. Other- 
wise it was  below 3 micromhos per centimeter. 
Another data point on the effect of water storage time on fuel-element fission pro- 
duct release was obtained in reactor cycle 87. To improve fuel-element utilization we 
purposely used elements that had been stored in water as long as 225 days. The water 
17 conductivity was at  all times less than 3 micromhos per centimeter. The N fission 
product monitor and the I 133/~131 ratio both showed that this cycle contained leaking 
fuel elements. However, the leaks were not large; the 1134 levels in the PCW did not 
exceed 35 000 disintegrations per minute per milliliter (5.84X10 dis/sec/m ). These 
elements were not dry sipped. 
contamination pickup during a reactor cycle as measured by the Xe133 release rate in 
the dry sipping operation. New elements were generally contaminated to levels of less 
than 5 ~ 1 0 - ~  microcurie per milliliter per minute (3.lXlO dis/sec/m ), while the older 
elements were generally contaminated to levels between 5 ~ 1 0 - ~  and ~ O X ~ O - ~  microcurie 
per milliliter per minute (3. 1x10 and 6 . 2 ~ 1 0  dis/sec/m ) when these elements were 
8 
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(2) A correlation of common characteristics or factors for  all leaking elements was 
(3) Elements B-130 and B-203 were disassembled in the PBR Hot Laboratory to 
i 
No correlations were found with average and peak-to-average burnup or  element 
4 3 
4 3 
8 3 
A correlation may also exist between element storage time in water and element 
4 3 
4 4 3 
operated in the same cycles. 
also be the beginning phases of fission product leakage or a combination of leakage and 
increased contamination. No correlation with other common characteristics or factors 
was found. 
Perhaps the most interesting findings came from the Hot Laboratory disassembly 
of elements B-130 and B-203. The individual plates were  removed from each element 
(see appendix C). 
and a stereomicroscope. 
shows a typical gouge on the convex side of a plate. 
found on exterior plates of fuel  elements. A 0.015-inch- (0.38-mm-) deep gouge was 
found in the fuel meat region. A 0.040-inch- (1.02-mm-) deep gouge was found adjacent 
to the fuel meat region. The fuel-cladding thickness is 0.020 inch (0.51 mm). Fig- 
ure  5(b) shows gouge paths on the convex side of a plate. There is evidence of corrosion 
beginning along the gouge paths. Figure 5(c) shows typical corrosion on the concave side 
of the plates of this element. 
path. The corrosion along the gouge paths apparently occurred during storage of the 
element after the gouges had occurred. The corrosion on the concave side of the plates 
is not associated with a location of mechanical damage. 
The finding of gouges on the interior plates of element B-130 requires a revision to 
an analytical conclusion that enough force was not present to cause damage by foreign 
particles. Vibration of the plates against entrapped foreign particles may be the expla- 
nation. 
plates show pitting-type corrosion. 
different plates, which had penetrated into the fuel region. Figure 6(b) shows a pit, on 
the concave side of a plate, which had not yet penetrated the depth of the cladding. All 
of these plates from element B-203 had a brownish-gold film on the lower half of the 
plates. The cation elements of these films were identical to the cladding material and 
its trace elements. 
tion found between Xe133 release in the dry sipping operation and the storage time of 
the elements in the poor quality water. 
This higher value of the older elements, however, may 
The plates were then examined remotely with a Kollmorgen periscope 
t Several plates from element B-130 are shown in figures 5(a) to (d). Figure 5(a) 
See page 6 for a discussion of gouges 
Figure 5(d) shows a gouge path with corrosion along the 
Several plates from element B-203 are shown in figures 6(a) to (b). All of these 
Figure 6(a) shows pits, on the concave side of 
The pitting-type corrosion on both elements B-130 and B-203 supports the correla- 
Element B-203 had a longer storage time than 
B-130. 
The fact  that corrosion was almost exclusively restricted to the concave side of the 
plates has not been explained. However, it has been learned that different dies are used 
in the plate bending operation. A rubber die contacts the convex side, and a steel die 
contacts the concave side of the plates. It may be that foreign particles are imparted to 
the concave side of the plate by the steel die, although the vendor discounts this possi- 
bility. 
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The presence of the brownish-gold film on element B-203 and its absence on element 
B-130 have not been explained. It may be due to the longer water storage time of B-203 
or to a larger release of fission products during in-pile operation by this element. 
The hot laboratory examination led to the conclusion that element B-203 was a larger 
fission product source than was element B-130. But the dry sipping test gave the oppo- 
site results. This discrepancy was probably due to the large pits in element B-203 having 
released a larger portion of the fission products to the PCW, leaving less to be released 
in the dry sipping test. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Fission product release from fuel elements to the Plum Brook Reactor Primary 
Cooling Water (PCW) System was experienced in five consecutive reactor cycles. The 
causes of this release have been determined, and restrictions have been adopted to avoid 
a recurrence. The following conclusions were drawn from the solution of this problem: 
1. Pitting-type corrosion of the fuel elements occurs from extended storage of the 
elements in water. When the Conductivity of the storage water, in micromhos per centi- 
meter, ranged from 5 to 30 for 70 days, 3 to 5 for 10 days, and below 3 for 110 days, the 
fuel-element cladding was violated. In water whose conductivity was  below 3 micromhos 
per centimeter for  225 days, the cladding was  also violated, although not as severely. 
The pH in both cases varied between 5.5 and 7.2. 
sult from the presence of small foreign particles in the PCW System. Straining with a 
1/16-inch- (1.59-mm-) hole-size strainer did not avoid the damage. Straining with a 
filter of 1/32-inch (0.795-mm) hole size eliminated the damage. 
3. A dry sipping method, described in this report, was used successfully to locate 
irradiated fuel elements which have fission product leaks. 
4. A wet sipping method, also described in this report, was not successful in locating 
fuel elements which have fission product leaks. 
5. The iodine-133/iodine-131 ratio and data from a nitrogen-17 fission product 
monitor were valuable in detecting fission product injection into the PCW and in deter- 
mining whether the source was a leaking element or  uranium contamination. 
mized by using several data producing operations simultaneously. These included 
2. Damage to fuel-element cladding with associated fission product release can re- 
6. The effect of the fission product release on reactor operating efficiency was mini- 
10 
operating the reactor at power levels conducive to data generation, dry sipping irradiated 
elements, and visually examining irradiated elements. 
Lewis Research Center, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Cleveland, Ohio, May 7, 1969, 
122 -29 -05-11-22. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODS USED TO ASSESS FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE TO A 
REACTOR PRIMARY COOLING WATER SYSTEM 
The Plum Brook Reactor (PBR) relies predominantly on two methods for determin- 
ing the fission product injection into the PCW System. These methods are radiochemistry 
analyses of samples taken from the system and a nitrogen-17 (N 
monitor. 
The N17 system uses two neutron detectors spaced about two N17 half-lives apart  
17 in the PCW System. The ratio of signals from the two detectors is constant when N 
is the neutron contributor. Delayed neutrons from fresh fission products cause a drop 
in the ratio. . The presence of N17, which normally produces an undesired background 
for delayed neutron detection, is used to advantage to give a constant indication that the 
system is operating properly. This system responds rapidly to the delayed neutrons 
f rom fresh fission products. A normal ratio indicates no fission product injection into 
the PCW. A below-normal ratio indicates a constant injection rate of fission products. 
A decreasing ratio indicates an increasing fission product injection rate. 
products of interest, this had not yet been done at the time the PCW fission product pro- 
blem occurred. The system had just  been installed. Consequently, it provided valuable 
qualitative, but little quantitative, information during the fission product problem. 
Radiochemistry analyses provided activities of the various fission product elements. 
The ratio of two of these fission product activities (I133 to I 
distinguishing between fission products from uranium contamination and those from 
fuel-element leakage during cycles 76 through 80. 
is the ratio of the fission yields of 1133 and I131. The equilibrium ratio in the PCW 
System from uranium contamination is calculated to be in the range of 10 to 15. Since 
this ratio is affected by both the decay of each isotope and the cleanup of the isotopes by 
the PCW bypass cleanup system, its magnitude is not precisely determined. It is believed 
to be between 10 and 15, however. For  purposes of clarification, this range of 10 to 15 
is hereinafter referred to as the normal range. From these two calculated results, the 
following statements can be made: 
would start at a high value and decrease to the normal value. 
during a cycle, the ratio would start at a high value and decrease to a level between 2 and 
the normal value during the cycle. 
17 ) fission product 
Although the system ratio can be calibrated in te rms  of steady-state levels of fission 
13 1) was quite valuable in 
The equilibrium ratio inside a nonleaking fuel element is calculated to be 2.2, which 
(1) For uranium contamination and no fuel-element fission product leak, the ratio 
(2) For a new leaking element which does not reach an equilibrium level of I 131 
12 
(3) For a relatively old leaking element which contained no 1133 but still  contained 
13 1 some I , the ratio would start low, increase to a maximum, and then decrease to a 
level between 2 and the normal value. 
From these statements it can be seen how this information may be used to assess the 
source of fission products. 
Typical results obtained at PBR are as follows: 
(1) The ratio in a good cycle with no fission product leakage decreases from about 
(2) Cycles with high 1134 levels have started with a ratio of 14 and decreased to a 
(3) Other cycles with high 1134 levels have started with a ratio of 5, increased to 12, 
16 to 11. This corresponds to item (1) in the preceding paragraph. 
level of 4. 
and decreased to 4. 
t 
This corresponds to item (2) in the preceding paragraph. 
i 
This corresponds to item (3) in the preceding paragraph. 
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APPENDIX B 
DRY SIPPING APPARATUS 
The dry sipping apparatus shown in figure 7 consists of a test chamber (fig. 8) 
mounted 13 feet (3.96 m) below water, a chamber evacuation system, a gas collection 
and disposal system, a chamber f i l l  system, and an emergency cooling system. 
gage) regulated air through a 0.75-inch (1.9-cm) line to the chamber head to force the 
water from the test chamber. A bubbler drain on the bottom of the chamber is used to 
indicate that evacuation is completed. 
(2.07X10 -N/m gage) accumulator, a 0.75-inch (1.9-cm) vent line, a 5-cubic-inch 
(8. 2X10-5-m3) cylindrical sample container, and a 0.5-inch (1.27-cm) line to the off- 
gas cleanup system. Samples of the gas are analyzed for  Xe133 activity. 
(5.5X10 -N/m gage) deionized water through a manually operated valve to the bottom of 
the test chamber. The displaced air is disposed of through the gas collection and dis- 
posal system to the off-gas cleanup system. 
5 2 80-psig (5.5X10 -N/m gage) deionized water through a solenoid-operated valve to the 
bottom of the chamber. The solenoid valve is controlled by the set point recorder to 
open when the fuel-element sideplate temperature reaches 350' F (449 K). The manual 
valve in the chamber f i l l  system is used as a backup for emergency cooling. 
4 4 2 The chamber evacuation system supplies 7 to 9 psig (4.85XlO to 6.23x10 N/m 
The gas collection and disposal system consists of a nitrogen-charged, 300-psig 
6 2 
The chamber f i l l  system consists of a 1.0-inch (2. 54-cm) line supplying 80-psig 
5 2 
The emergency cooling system consists of a 1.0-inch (2.54-cm) line supplying 
The following is a description of how the system was used: 
(1) The test chamber was evacuated and a background sample of air obtained. If 
the Xe133 activity in this background sample measures > 1X10-6 microcurie per milli- 
liter (3. 7x10 dis/sec/m ), the system is flushed and purged until this value is reached. 
(7.03X10 J/sec) is inserted into the test chamber, and the head is installed and bolted 
down. A heat generation rate of < 2.4X10 Btu per hour (7.03X10 J/sec) ensures that 
the temperature of the fuel does not exceed 400' F (478 K). 
(3) The chamber is evacuated by opening valve C and then valve A (fig. 7) and sup- 
plying air at 7 to 9 psig (4.85XlO to 6.23X10 N/m gage) to force the water out through 
valve C. 
4 3 
3 (2) A fuel element with a calculated heat generation of < 2.4X10 Btu per hour 
2 
3 2 
4 4 2 
(4) When bubbles a r e  observed coming from valve C, both valves A and C a re  closed. 
(5) The fuel-element sideplate temperature is allowed to r i se  to 300' F (422 K); 
then valve B is opened to allow cooling water to enter the chamber. 
14 
(6) A sample of the gas trapped in the chamber is obtained by venting one-half of 
the accumulator through valve J, opening valve H until a water level is seen in the sight 
glass, and then closing valve H. The accumulator is pressurized by closing valve J, 
6 2 opening valve K until the accumulator gage reaches 300 psig (2.07XlO N/m gage), and 
then closing valve K. Valve L is opened, allowing the gas to flow into the sample con- 
6 2 tainer. When the sample container pressure gage reached 285 psig (1.96X10 N/m gage), 
valve L is closed. The gas remaining in the system is discharged to the off-gas cleanup 
system through valve G. The sample container is removed for analysis. 
storage cart. 
(7) The test  chamber head is removed and the tested fuel element moved to the 
15 
APPENDIX C 
FUEL-ELEMENT DISASSEMBLY 
Disassembly of the fuel elements was accomplished by cutting off sections of the 
edge of the sideplates (fig. 9) and removing each fueled plate in cell 1 of the Hot Labora- 
tory. The X-rays of the plates were carefully examined for fue l  location and cutting 
clearances prior to disassembly. The fuel element was clamped to the table of a modi- 
fied commercial 10-inch (25.4-cm) table saw driven by a 1-horsepower (0.746-kW), 
3450-rpm (57.5-rps) motor (fig. 10). The ratio of cutting blade to motor speed was 
1 to 1. The element was fed into the saw by a modified 0. 5-inch- (1.27-cm-) capacity 
variable speed drill motor at 1 inch per minute (0.0424 cm/sec). 
down the entire edge of each sideplate. This freed the top fueled plate from the side- 
plates. Identical slices were made through the width of the sideplates, freeing fueled 
plates as the slice progressed. It took approximately 1 hour to free each plate. 
The saw was mounted in a large f l a t  pan, and a vacuum cleaner was used to remove 
all chips. Health safety personnel monitored all cutting operations. 
Following the Hot Laboratory examination, results of which are contained in the 
main text, the elements were reassembled using aluminum bolts, nuts, and spacers and 
returned to the fuel  storage facility. 
A slice, 0.115 inch (0.292 cm) wide and 0.188 inch (0.477 cm) deep, was made 
16 
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TABLE I. - FUEL-ELEMENT TEST RESULTS 
Fuel 
elemen 
- 
B-054 
B-060 
B -068 
B -07 1 
B-127 
B-130 
B-134 
B-135 
B-136 
B-138 
B-141 
B-142 
B-143 
B - 144 
B-145 
B-146 
B-147 
B-150 
B-160 
B-169 
B-186 
B-190 
B -203 
B-204 
B -209 
B-210 
B-C15 
B-C16 
B-C20 
B-C28 
3toragc 
:ime ir 
water, 
days 
594 
594 
560 
560 
7 
132 
10 
224 
224 
136 
157 
194 
155 
138 
63 
2 02 
63 
157 
19 1 
6 
235 
235 
301 
301 
268 
268 
288 
16 
37 
63 
xenon-133 release ratea 
10.6x10-' 
52.3 
18.7 
8.1 
1.1 
2300.0 
1.3 
208.0 
26.0 
9.2 
3.6 
11. 5 
2.3 
8.6 
. 4  
179.0 
6.7 
3 . 1  
1.6 
1. 7 
. 2  
3 .1  
309.0 
61. 3 
14.2 
61. 6 
252.0 
6.9 
6.3 
8.6 
iis/sec/m 3 /sei 
6. 6X104 
3. 2x105 
1.2 
6.9X10 
5 . 0 ~ 1 0 ~  
3 
1 . 4 ~ 1 0 ~  
8 . 0 ~ 1 0 ~  
1. 3X106 
1. 6x105 
5. 7x1O4 
2.2 
7. 1 
1.4 
5 .3  
2.4X10 
l . lX l0  
1.9x10 
9.7 
3 
6 
4 . 1 ~ 1 0 ~  
1 . 0 ~ 1 0 ~  
3 
3 l . lX l0  
1 . 9 ~ 1 0 ~  
1.9x106 
3 . 8 ~ 1 0 ~  
8 . 8 ~ 1 0 ~  
3. 8x105 
1. 6X1O6 
4 . 3 ~ 1 0 ~  
3.9 
5.3 
Fue l  
elemeni 
B-C42 
B -C43 
B-C44 
B -C49 
B-C50 
E -002 
E-005 
E -006 
E -008 
E -009 
E -010 
E-011 
E-012 
E -014 
E -017 
E-021 
E -022 
E -023 
E -025 
E -026 
E -027 
E-028 
E -029 
E -03 1 
E -032 
E -034 
E -038 
E -039 
E -052 
E -059 
Storagr 
time in 
water,  
days 
1 
0 
10 
26 
6 
58 
62 
58 
62 
57 
a 
4 
4 
4 
58 
0 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
4 
4 
xenon-133 release ratea 
3 . 3 ~ 1 0 - ~  
1. 5 
2.6 
1.1 
7 .1  
2 .1  
3.3 
. 1  
0 
. 2  
1 .0  
3 .9  
3 . 1  
9 . 9  
0 
. 1  
. 1  
. 1  
.1  
1. 3 
. 6  
. 2  
1 
.1  
!. 4 
) 
. 2  
3 
I 
I 
3 lis/sec/m jse 
2.ox1o4 
9 . 4 ~ 1 0 ~  
1. 6x104 
6. 5 x 1 0 ~  
4. 4x104 
1 . 3  
2.1 
5.1x10 
1.2 
2 
1 . 2 ~ 1 0 ~  
6.4 
2. &lo4 
1 .9  
6. 1 
2. 6X1O2 
5.4 
2.4 
7.2 
7.2 
8 . 3  
7 . 7 ~ 1 0 ~  
3.4 
1 . 2  
3.2 
1. 5x104 
1. 9x102 
6. 5X101 
1. 3X1O2 
7. 7X1O1 
6. 7 
aNormalized to shutdown of cycle last  used. 
18 
In strumentation 
wiring trough-, 
, 
Water quadrant C 
Fuel-element transfer ch ute -:;:':~~~""ilo..1 -=:'~~_'!l\! 
Reactor core -.., ............. 
Upper thermal shi 
In stru mentation 
Lower thermal shields 
lLily pad 
\ 
Figure 1. - Reactor tank assembly. 
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C D-930-22 
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(a) Horizontal section. 
Figure 2. - Reactor core. (Dimensions are in inches. 
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Figure 3. - Pr imary water activity. Cycle 80; core 3. 
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Figure 4. - Fuel-element test results. 
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(a) Typical gouge, convex su rface. 
(b) Typical gouge path, convex surface. 
(a) Typical corrosion pits showing penetration, concave surfaces. 
(c) Typical corrosion, concave surface. 
1 mm 
C-69-1507 
(d) Gouge path exhibiting initial corrosion, concave surface. 
Figure 5. - Fuel element 8-130, showing gouging and corrosion. 
(b) Initial stage of corrosion. 
Figu re 6. - Fuel element 8-203 showing corrosion . 
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C P-10424-11 \- Emergency cooling l i ne  
Figure 7. - Dry  sipping apparatus. Dimensions are in inches. 
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Figure 8. - Test chamber. Dimensions are in inches. 
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Figure 10. - Fuel-element disassembly fixture. 
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